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make the 'cognitive mistake' of underestimating their own abilities at the 
onset of a disability. Silvers' stance, therefore, is not a wholesale dismissal 
of different standpoints. Rather, she cautions us to be critically conscious of 
our fears whether we are communicating our actual or imagined standpoints. 
Although Silvers, Wasserman and Mahowald employ ideas around differ-
ent standpoints, the role of standpoint theory is not discussed. With the rise 
of disability culture and the growing number of voices of people with disabili-
ties, it seems remiss ofus to not evaluate the role of standpoint theory in the 
deliberation of justice for people with disabilities. For example, what consti-
tutes a 'disability standpoint?' For people with cognitive disabilities, our 
definition of 'standpoint' and 'self-knowledge' must be re-examined for any 
potential biases. A multitude of standpoints can work to enrich our under-
standing of injustice and justice much like Lawrence C. Becker's call for 
reciprocity in the book's afterword (293-303). If mutuality and reciprocity are 
integral to social cohesion and issues of justice for people with disabilities, 
should not only actions but knowledge be reciprocated? Perhaps one day, 
people with disabilities will argue the 'problem' of non-disability and its 
accompanying 'cognitive mistake' about physical and mental acceleration. 
But perhaps that is the future book for which this book provides an opening. 
Ritz Chow 
(Women's Studies) 
Simon Fraser University 
John Skorupski, ed. 
The Cambridge Companion to Mill. 
New York: Cambridge University Press 1997. 
Pp. xiii+ 591. 
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-41987-5); 
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-42211-6). 
The Cambridge Companion to Mill is, to the best ofmy knowledge, the longest 
volume to be dedicated to a philosopher in this series; this is fitting, consid-
ering the major contributions Mill made in numerous areas of philosophy 
and the fact that the significance of many of these contributions has been 
rediscovered only relatively recently. Overall, the book is a great success. 
Admittedly, there is no clear answer to the question of who its intended 
audience is. Some articles will be easily accessible to readers who are new to 
philosophy, while others require more background. Some will be of consider-
able interest to Mill scholars, while the material discussed in others will 
already be familiar to the specialist (often from a book by the same author). 
But then one is never quite certain for whom the Cambridge Companion's 
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are meant. This overall lack of direction is not a fatal flaw so long as most of 
a volume's individual chapters prove valuable to some audience or other; 
happily, this is sure to be true of this installment in the series. 
John Skorupski contributes both an editor's introduction and a chapter 
on 'Mill on Language and Logic' (plus an extensive bibliography of secondary 
literature on Mill). The introduction tracks Mill's philosophical fortunes, 
which have risen of late, due in part to a resurgence of philosophical 
naturalism (Mill's thoroughgoing naturalism is a theme which runs through 
a number of chapters). Skorupski places Mill in a tradition of naturalistic 
thought less familiar than Hume's, viz., that of Reid; both Mill and Reid 
affirm that skepticism need not be taken seriously, because certain primitive 
belief-forming dispositions do not stand in need of validation beyond a 
determination of their primitiveness (though Mill recognizes considerably 
fewer such dispositions than Reid). Skorupski concludes with a brief but 
insightful analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Mill's utilitarianism, 
and a comparison of nineteenth- and twentieth-century liberalisms; he finds 
the earlier classical liberalism more compelling, since it affirms the truth of 
a robust 'romantic-hellenk' ideal rather than resting on a pallid 'epistemo-
logical neutrality' about the summum bonum. In the succeeding chapter 
Skorupski provides an overview of Mill's theory of meaning and his empiricist 
philosophy of logic; he defends the latter against critics ranging from Kan-
tians to Husserl. 
That Wendy Donner's essay 'Mill's Utilitaiianism' opens with a defense 
of Mill's 'qualitative hedonism' will come as no surprise to those who are 
familiar with her 1992 book The Liberal Self. The latter half of the article 
focuses on Mill's criteria for morally wrong actions and the role he assigns to 
moral rules, including rules of justice. In the first four chapters of Utilitari-
anism, Mill's criterion for judging actions is apparently the familiar act-utili-
tarian one, combined with an account of moral rules as valuable 
rules-of-thumb; in the concluding chapter on justice, however, he asserts that 
an action is wrong only if it ought to be punished by the agent's conscience, 
and perhaps other sanctions as well. Strictly speaking these criteria are not 
mutually inconsistent, but they do not cohere well with one another; given 
Mill's utilitarian theory of punishment, and the connection between punish-
ment (by both conscience and courts) and violations of rules, the 'punishabil-
ity' criterion seems to take him in the direction of rule-utilitarianism. There 
is thus a significant tension within Mill's account of the moral evaluation of 
actions. Donner seems to agree that Mill advances two incongruent criteria 
for morally evaluating actions, and she comments that 'puzzles ... arise' as 
a result; nevertheless, because she does little to highlight this tension, and 
evinces approval for Mill at almost every step, the non-specialist for whom 
she writes may not realize its severity. 
Jonathan Riley's contribution deals with MilJ as a political economist; 
philosophers who write on Mill but who have paid little attention to his 
Principles of Political Economy (and no doubt there are many) will profit 
greatly from this chapter (no pun intended). Riley rightly emphasizes the fact 
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that Mill believes improvement to economic institutions and practices must 
occur gradually, both because some kinds of improvements will only be 
feasible when the people themselves have improved, which can only happen 
slowly, and because rapid change would lead to legitimate expectations going 
unfulfilled, which would, in Mill's eyes, constitute an intolerable injustice. 
Mary Lyndon Shanley contributes a synopsis of The Subjection of Women. 
She sticks fairly closely to this text, however, and does not devote much space 
to what Mill (or Harriet Taylor) has to say elsewhere about the status of 
women. Nor does she add any commentary on Mill's own marriage in the 
course of discussing his understanding of ideal marriages; Mill scholars are 
already familiar with this union, but Shanley writes for a general audience 
which might find some biographical material interesting and helpful. She 
mentions some of the criticisms which nineteenth-century conservatives and 
twentieth-century feminists have made of the Subjection and briefly defends 
Mill, but here too she might have said more. In short, the article is a bit too 
short, although it is nevertheless a well-executed overview which could 
appropriately be assigned to students reading On Liberty in order to give 
them a more comprehensive understanding of Mill's social-political philoso-
phy. 
C.L. Ten's 'Democracy, Socialism, and the Working Class' would also be a 
valuable supplement to readers of On Liberty. Ten's overall theme is that 
although Mill is critical of the working class as he finds it, his expectations 
for its 'probable futurity' are high. In the initial sections of this (relatively 
brieO chapter, Ten explores Mill's views on democratic government. He 
adroitly summarizes Mill's efforts to devise a system of democracy which 
gives every citizen a genuine say in how government intellectually and 
morally advanced few to be drowned out by those of the selfish, short-sighted, 
and poorly-educated many. Later in the chapter Ten discusses Mill's support 
for worker-ownership of firms and his views on socialism and communism. 
This material is treated in more than one chapter (including Riley's, obvi-
ously), but the different discussions are generally complementary; Ten's is 
helpful because of the attention he gives to the schemes of worker coopera-
tion, socialism and communism upon which Mill looks with the greatest 
favor. One surprise: although Mill's opposition to 'revolutionary' centralized 
socialism is mentioned, references to 'Marx' or 'Marxism' are conspicuously 
absent. 
Terry Irwin's fascinating article on 'Mill and the Classical World' will be 
of considerable interest to Mill scholars, for nothing like it exists elsewhere. 
Irwin concentrates on Mill's treatment of the Athenian democracy and his 
reception of Plato. He emphasizes the influence on MilJ of George Grote 
(although he also calls attention to several of their disagreements). Grote 
challenges the anti-democratic lessons which Tories (and Thucydides!) drew 
from the Athenian experience, and Mill celebrates the Athenians' ability to 
combine individual liberty with public spirit. Mill holds Plato's elenctic 
method in the highest esteem but has only contempt for his substantive 
positions. Irwin is perhaps unnecessarily bothered by the fact that Mill 
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rejects Plato's view that rational argument can establish that virtue is a part 
of human happiness, but nevertheless maintains that a person with a proper 
upbringing will believe that virtue is a part of her happiness. Does this mean 
that, according to Mill, giving a child a proper upbringing involves instilling 
a belief for which there is no rational ground? No. Virtue is a part of happiness 
only for those individuals who have received a proper upbringing, one which 
led them to form a mental association between pleasure and virtue. No 
rational argument can establish that virtue is part of every person's happi-
ness, since this is false. Nor, according to Mill, will rational argument make 
virtue into a part of someone's happiness if it is not one already; offering up 
syllogisms is not the way to form the requisite association. But if I have 
benefitted from a proper upbringing then virtue will be a part of my happi-
ness, and my ability to recognize my own desires and pleasures will provide 
me with a rational ground for believing this to be so. 
While there is little to criticize about its execution, Peter Nicholson's 'The 
Reception and Early Reputation of Mill's Political Thought' may contribute 
less value to the collection than any of the other articles simply in virtue of 
its subject-matter. While the reaction of nineteenth-century thinkers to On 
Liberty and The Subjection. of Women is an interesting topic, the point of 
Nicholson's discussion is not really the enhancement of our understanding 
of Mill. Furthermore, John Rees has written on the initial reception of the 
first of these works, and nineteenth-century commentaries on both works are 
readily available thanks to collections ofreviews published by the Thoemmes 
Press and Liberty Fund's publication of Stephen's Liberty, Equality, and 
Fraternity. Still, the article is an interesting and worthwhile read. A particu-
lar highpoint is Nicholson's defense of On Liberty against early critics who 
maintained that nineteenth-century Britain was experiencing no shortage of 
individuality or eccentricity (Macaulay: 'He is really crying "Fire!" in Noah's 
flood'). As Nicholson observes, Mill seems to be both taking a longer view and 
operating with a more radical conception of individuality than his critics. 
Alan Ryan's focus in 'Mill in a Liberal Landscape' is on 'the difficulties a 
late twentieth-century reader will have with Mill's liberalism' (497). The first 
section is a general overview of On Liberty and of Mill's (and, perhaps I should 
add, Taylor's) aims in composing the book. On the whole this discussion will 
prove valuable to readers who are new to Mill, although in places Ryan moves 
so quickly that it is difficult to follow him from idea to idea. In the final section 
of the article, Ryan compares and contrasts Mill's liberalism with those of 
Rawls, Dewey, the British Idealists and Berlin. Although personally I am 
satisfied to see Mill compared favorably with Rawls, I suspect that Ryan is 
not entirely fair to the latter; is it really accurate to say that 'Rawls writes 
as though the liberal project is to create a society of individuals whose 
primary commitments are to their own private well-being on the one hand 
and to their consciences on the other' (521)? Skorupski's comparison of these 
same two thinkers is the more illuminating. 
It would take a philosopher of mathematics, and more space than remains 
here, to do justice to Philip Kitcher's lengthy 'Mill, Mathematics, and the 
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Naturalist Tradition'. Nevertheless, some mention must be made of this 
chapter, which may be the most important in the book. Kitcher's aim is that 
of rescuing Mill's naturalistic account of mathematics from the philosophical 
scrap-heap into which it has been placed by its transcendentalist critics, most 
notably Frege. While Mill's general approach undoubtedly stands in need of 
some emendation and development, its great advantage over its transcen-
dentalist 1ivals, according to Kitcher, is its ability to explain the acquisition 
of mathematical knowledge, which it does in terms of interaction with the 
physical world. The chief problem it has to overcome is that of answering the 
question of what entities mathematical knowledge is knowledge about, and 
Kitcher argues that the Millian program has the resources for providing an 
answer. 
While it is impossible to do more than list the remaining essays, there are 
grounds for praising each of them. They are: Geoffery Scarre, 'Mil I on 
Induction and the Scientific Method'; Andy Hamilton, 'Mill, Phenomenalism, 
and the Self; Andy Millar, 'Mill on Religion'; Fred Wilson, 'Mill on Psychology 
and the Moral Sciences'; and John Robson, 'Civilization and Culture as Moral 
Sciences'. 
Dale E. Miller 
Old Dominion University 
David West 
An Introduction to Continental Philosophy. 
Cambridge: Polity 1996. Pp. viii + 278. 
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7456-1184-2); 
US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7456-1185-0). 
Giving a lucid, systematic introduction to continental philosophy, let alone 
doing so without imposing a homogenizing interpretive framework, particu-
larly at a time when the very dichotomy between continental and analytic 
philosophy is being challenged, is no mean feat. Yet this is just what David 
West has accomplished in his accessible account that lays out the historical 
context and main concerns of the various strands of continental philosophy 
and identifies their points of intersection and divergence. 
The structure of the book itself embodies West's characterization of 
continental philosophy as 'self-consciously historical' (1). Its first two chap-
ters provide the historical intellectual background for the middle three, 
which in turn serve as background for the final two. Continental philosophy 
begins, essentially, with Hegel whom West presents as attempting a synthe-
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